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Reetmae
Active State Role in the
Regulation of Title Search
Fees Required to Shield
Insurance Companies
From Liability
In Federal Trade Commission v.
Ticor Tile Insurance Co., 112 S.Ct.
2169 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that title insurance
companies are not protected from anti-
trust prosecution when title search fees
are fixed by state regulation and the
state does not take a substantial role in
the active supervision of the fees. Fur-
thermore, the Court found that negli-
gible levels of state regulatory supervi-
sion did not immunize the title insur-
ance companies.
Alleged Horizontal Price Fixing
Title insurance policies insure against
any unknown defects in the title or
ownership of real estate. Many states
throughout the country had authorized
private rating bureaus to establish uni-
form rates for title insurance premi-
ums, search fees, and examination
charges. The appropriate state agen-
cies then either approved or rejected
the recommended fees.
The Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") filed a complaint against six
of the nation's largest title companies,
alleging horizontal price fixing. The
five companies (the sixth settled in a
consent agreement with the FTC) com-
prised about 60 percent of the $1.35
billion title insurance industry. The
FTC did not challenge the practice of
setting uniform rates for the insurance
premiums, but rather objected to the
rate setting for the title search, exami-
nation, and settlement fees. The com-
plaint alleged a violation of § 5(a)(1) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), which forbids
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce."
In 1985, the FTC initially com-
plained of this rate-setting practice in
thirteen states, yet declined to pursue
the matter in five of these states. Later,
upon the recommendation of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge ("AL"), the
FTC dropped the complaint against
two of the remaining states, thus, leav-
ing only six states subject to the action.
However, after the FTC filed its
complaints, the title insurance compa-
nies abandoned this rate-setting system
because many private treble damage
suits were filed against them. Nonethe-
less, the ALJ held that the complaint
was still valid because nothing pre-
vented the companies from resuming
the rate setting practice. Therefore, the
ALJ conducted a hearing to examine
the alleged antitrust violations and to
consider the companies' state-action
immunity defense.
The State-Action Immunity
Doctrine
If a state authorizes and supervises
anti-competitive conduct, participants
in that conduct may enjoy immunity
from liability arising from that conduct
under the state-action immunity doc-
trine. The doctrine of state-action
immunity preserves the authority of
the states to establish beneficial price
fixing regulatory schemes that might
otherwise violate federal antitrust laws.
The United States Supreme Court es-
tablished a two part test in California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.
Ct. 937, 63 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1980), to
determine when state activity deserves
immunity. The first part of the Midcal
test requires the state to formulate an
express policy acknowledging the
anticompetitive scheme. The second
part of the Midcal test requires the
state's active supervision of the private
actors participating in the regulatory
program. Where both parts of the test
are satisfied, the state-action immunity
doctrine bars antitrust claims.
The Midcal Test and Lower Court
Decisions
In the administrative hearing, the
ALJ found antitrust violations in only
two states, Connecticut and Wisconsin,
because they failed to satisfy the Midcal
test. But on appeal to the FTC Review
Commission, the Commission found
antitrust violations by the title insur-
ance companies in all six states. In
reaching this decision, the Commission
determined that the title companies
were not entitled to state-action immu-
nity because: (1) the level of state
supervision of the rate setting practice
was insufficient to satisfy the second
prong of the Midcal test in four of the
states; and (2) the other two states'
statutes did not contain a policy suffi-
cient to satisfy the first prong of the
Midcal test.
On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the decision because it found
that state supervision of the rating bu-
reaus was sufficient to grant immunity.
The Third Circuit applied the standard
that a state's supervision is sufficient
when state law authorizes and operates
a regulatory program.
The United States Supreme Court
granted review of the Third Circuit
decision. However, since the FTC
relinquished its claims against the two
states, the Court only considered the
four states that failed the second prong
of the Midcal.
State's Supervision Insufficient
The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Third Circuit because it
found that the supervision in two states
did not rise to a level sufficient to
warrant immunity from the antitrust
laws. However, the Court could not
determine the adequacy of the supervi-
sion in the remaining two states and
therefore remanded the decision to the
Third Circuit to re-examine this issue.
The Supreme Court's decision fo-
cused on the second prong of theMidcal
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test. The Court criticized the Third
Circuit for adopting a standard that
amounted to a mere potential for super-
vision rather than a stricter standard of
active supervision. The Court held that
a state must play a substantial role in
determining the specifics of the state
policy and not merely rubber stamp an
agreement among the private parties.
Moreover, because a negative option
regulatory program setting the prices
and the rates the private companies
proposed became effective unless ex-
pressly vetoed by the state, the Court
placed the burden of proof on the
companies to show that the states ad-
equately supervised the rate-setting pro-
cess.
In light of this strict standard, the
Court examined the programs estab-
lished in the two states that lacked
adequate supervision. Based on the
factual findings of the ALJ, the Court
noted that in both states, the rate-set-
ting programs lacked any supervision
whatsoever. Thus, the Court found
that the level of supervision for these
two states could not support a grant of
immunity.
Additionally, the Supreme Court
offered grounds to distinguish this rul-
ing in future applications. First, the
Court noted that the gravity of the
offense here was extreme: horizontal
price fixing is the most "pernicious"
antitrust offense. Second, the Court
pointed to the dominating role of the
private companies in the rate setting
process. Third, the Court cited the
clear lack of state supervision, not
merely a temporary lapse.
Dissent Fears Increased Litigation
The three dissenting justices noted
that the controversy concerning the
application of the state-action immu-
nity doctrine is far from finished. They
regarded the strict standard adopted by
the majority as ambiguous, untenable,
and as litigation-breeding. Also, the
dissenters stated that previous applica-
tions of the Midcal test examined
whether a state had the power to reject
or control the proposed uniform rates.
The dissent also stated that the strict
active supervision standard adopted by
the Court required close scrutiny into
whether the states played a substantial
role in the rate setting process. How-
ever, since the Court neither defined
this standard nor established any bench-
marks, the dissent reasoned that its
application would be arbitrary at best.
Furthermore, the dissent reasoned
that companies would now be less likely
to participate in negative option regu-
latory programs because the burden is
on them, under penalty of antitrust
treble damages, to prove that the states
substantially performed their duties. o:o
- Marc V. Richards
FTC Not Required to Rely
on Extrinsic Evidence to
Determine Fraudulent
Implied Claims in
Advertising
InKraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992),
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a manufacturer violated the
Federal Trade Commission Act when it
misrepresented the content of its cheese
slices. Furthermore, the court stated
that its own reasoned analysis, rather
than extrinsic evidence, may be used in
determining the implied claims con-
tamined in the challenged advertisements.
Kraft Singles Advertisements
Fraudulent
In the early 1980's, Kraft, Inc.
("Kraft") began losing market share in
the sliced cheese market. The loss of
market share resulted from the intro-
duction of imitation cheese slices, which
were advertised as less expensive but
equally nutritious as Kraft's Singles, a
processed cheese slice. Kraftresponded
with an advertising campaign to in-
form consumers that Singles cost more
because they are made from five ounces
of milk rather than cheaper ingredi-
ents. The advertisements also focused
on the calcium content of Singles.
Although Kraft used five ounces of
milk to make each Single, roughly 30
percent of the calcium was lost in
processing. Additionally, the vast
majority of imitation slices sold in the
United States contained about 15 per-
cent of the U.S. daily recommended
allowance of calcium per ounce, approxi-
mately the same amount as in Singles.
The Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") complaint alleged that Kraft's
advertisements made two implied claims
that violated the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act ("the ACt"), which makes
it unlawful "to engage in unfair or
deceptive commercial practices or to
induce consumers to purchase certain
products through advertising that is
misleading in a material respect." The
FTC complaint charged that Kraft's
advertising campaign violated the Act
by materially misrepresenting the cal-
cium content and relative calcium ben-
efit of Singles by implying that a Single
contains the same amount of calcium as
five ounces of milk ("Milk Equiva-
lency Claim") and that Singles contain
more calcium than imitation slices
("Imitation Superiority Claim").
One of the two advertisements at
issue in this case featured a young girl
eating a Single as a narrator said
"... Imitation slices use hardly any
milk. But Kraft has five ounces per
slice. Five ounces. So her little bones
get calcium they need to grow..."
Later, in the same ad, milk was poured
into a glass until it reached a mark
denoted five ounces. In January 1986,
Kraft revised the script of the adver-
tisements from "Kraft has five ounces
per slice" to "Kraft is made from five
ounces per slice." In March 1987,
Kraft added the disclosure "one 3/4
ounce slice has 70 percent of the cal-
cium of five ounces of milk" as a
subscript on the television ad and as a
footnote in the print ad.
The second ad in controversy, em-
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